Open Directory Investigation: This sample was discovered on an open directory hosted at IP address 109.230.231.37, representing an active malware distribution point. The presence of multiple RAT variants on this infrastructure suggests organized malware distribution operations targeting opportunistic victims. To see all other reports from this investigation see Executive Overview
Analyst Note: This is been a trend in my findings and reports lately, there has been many different findings of XWorm being involved in many different places, levels of sophistication, and operations. This is one of the main reasons I picked this out of all these 30+ samples found in this directory to drill into further.
Campaign Identifier: Arsenal-237-109.230.231.37-Malware-Repository
Last Updated: January 9, 2026
BLUF (Bottom Line Up Front)
Executive Summary
Business Impact Summary
agent_xworm.exe is a CRITICAL-severity Remote Access Trojan (RAT) confirmed as belonging to the XWorm malware family. This 16KB .NET-compiled malware represents the latest evolution of XWorm RAT, which achieved massive scale in 2024-2025 with over 18,459 devices compromised worldwide in a single builder campaign. The sample demonstrates professional-grade development with hardcoded command-and-control infrastructure (109.230.231.37), Base64-encoded communications, and comprehensive offensive capabilities including PowerShell execution, system reconnaissance, and file download functionality.
XWorm’s architecture revolves around a heartbeat-based TCP client that maintains persistent connection to attacker infrastructure using authentication secrets (AgentSec_8hJ3kL6mN9pQ2rS5tU8vW1xY4zA7bC0d). Static analysis reveals modular command handlers for process enumeration, service discovery, domain checking, and arbitrary command execution. The malware’s small footprint (16KB) combined with hidden console operation indicates a lightweight first-stage payload designed for rapid deployment and minimal detection surface.
The threat landscape for XWorm has evolved significantly in 2025, with Version 6 (released June 4, 2025) introducing “fully re-coded, RCE-Fixed” capabilities along with advanced evasion techniques (AMSI bypass, ETW tampering). XWorm is increasingly deployed as part of multi-malware campaigns, with 78% delivering secondary payloads including AsyncRAT and LockBit Black ransomware.
Key Risk Factors
| Risk Factor | Score | Business Impact |
|---|---|---|
| Overall Risk | 8.5/10 | CRITICAL - Immediate response required |
| Data Exfiltration Risk | 9/10 | Full PowerShell execution + modular keylogging (plugin-based) |
| System Compromise | 9/10 | Complete remote control with modular payload delivery |
| Persistence Difficulty | 7/10 | Registry Run keys + Scheduled tasks (plugin-activated) |
| Evasion Capability | 9/10 | AMSI bypass, ETW tampering, hidden console, Base64 encoding |
| Lateral Movement Risk | 8/10 | PowerShell execution enables network pivoting and credential theft |
| Detection Difficulty | 9/10 | Small footprint, .NET obfuscation, dormant C2 behavior |
| Multi-Malware Risk | 8/10 | 78% of XWorm campaigns deliver secondary payloads (AsyncRAT, LockBit) |
Recommended Actions
- ISOLATE systems showing connections to 109.230.231.37 immediately
- BLOCK distribution infrastructure at network perimeter and internal firewalls
- DEPLOY behavioral detection rules for .NET RAT indicators and Base64-encoded C2
- HUNT enterprise-wide for file hashes, authentication secret “AgentSec_”, and PowerShell anomalies
- ROTATE credentials for all users on confirmed or suspected infected systems
- MONITOR for secondary payload delivery (AsyncRAT, LockBit ransomware)
Table of Contents
- Quick Reference
- File Identification
- Executive Technical Summary
- Deep Technical Analysis
- XWorm Family Threat Intelligence
- MITRE ATT&CK Mapping
- Frequently Asked Questions
- IOCs
- Detections
Quick Reference
Detections & IOCs:
File Identification
- Original Filename: agent_xworm.exe
- SHA256: 0ec3fca58ef8f0d9f098cd749dd209fccda7cbf68c1eecf836668e5dabd6f3bc
- SHA1: 0102782950619820bbcd60efca256c907403cfb0
- MD5: 9d963f85812fd02e382a48c41fc0387e
- File Size: 16,384 bytes (16 KB)
- Type: PE32 executable (console) Intel 80386, .NET assembly
- Framework: .NET Framework v4.0.30319 (Microsoft Visual Studio .NET)
- Family: XWorm RAT (CONFIRMED - HIGH confidence 95%)
- Version: Likely v5.x or early v6.x
- Distribution Source: IP 109.230.231.37 (CONFIRMED - Open Directory)
Discovery Context: Discovered on an open directory at 109.230.231.37, an active malware distribution point serving multiple RAT variants. The presence of “agent_xworm.exe” alongside “agent.exe” (PoetRAT) suggests infrastructure reuse by organized threat actors.
Executive Technical Summary
Business Context
agent_xworm.exe is a professional-grade Remote Access Trojan with confirmed attribution to the XWorm malware family, which compromised 18,459 devices worldwide in a single campaign. XWorm operates as Malware-as-a-Service (MaaS), with builder tools enabling rapid generation of customized samples. The June 2025 release of XWorm v6 introduced advanced evasion capabilities (AMSI bypass, ETW tampering) that significantly enhance detection difficulty.
Key Business Impacts
- Multi-Stage Attack Platform: 78% of XWorm campaigns deliver secondary malware (AsyncRAT, LockBit ransomware)
- Credential Harvesting: Modular keylogging plugins threaten corporate credentials and MFA bypass
- Network Pivoting: PowerShell execution enables lateral movement and Active Directory compromise
- Regulatory Exposure: Data exfiltration creates GDPR, HIPAA, PCI-DSS violation risks
- Ransomware Pipeline: Increasingly used as initial access for LockBit Black deployment
Detection Challenges
- .NET Compilation: Inherent complexity in reverse engineering, easily recompiled for signature evasion
- Small Footprint: 16KB binary evades size-based heuristics
- Legitimate Naming: “agent” naming pattern blends with enterprise software
- Dormant C2: Server offline during analysis (common XWorm evasion)
- Base64 Encoding: Obfuscated network traffic prevents simple inspection
- AMSI Bypass: XWorm v6 disables Antimalware Scan Interface
- ETW Tampering: Event Tracing for Windows evasion reduces logging
Deep Technical Analysis
Code Architecture
agent_xworm.exe is a 32-bit .NET console application with modular architecture:
Core Components:
- Main Loop:
Main()initiates C2 connection and heartbeat threads - Networking: TCP client (
System.Net.Sockets.TcpClient) with automatic reconnection - Command Handler:
HandleCmd()with dictionary-based command routing - Execution Engine:
Exec()for PowerShell command execution - Reconnaissance:
GetSysInfo(),GetLocalIP(),IsAdmin()for victim profiling - Encoding:
ToJson(),FromJson(), Base64 encoding (ToBase64String()) - Fingerprinting:
GetMachineId()using MD5 hashing for unique victim IDs
Configuration Constants:
VERSION - XWorm version identifier
HEARTBEAT_MS - Keepalive interval
RECONNECT_MS - Reconnection delay
SERVER_HOST - C2 IP (109.230.231.37)
SERVER_PORT - C2 TCP port
AGENT_SECRET - Authentication (AgentSec_8hJ3kL6mN9pQ2rS5tU8vW1xY4zA7bC0d)
Embedded PowerShell Commands:
- Process Enumeration:
-NoP -C Get-Process|Sort CPU -Desc|Select -First 20 Name,Id,CPU,WS|FT - Service Discovery:
-NoP -C Get-Service|?{$_.Status -eq 'Running'}|Select Name,Status,StartType|FT - Domain Checking:
-NoP -C Get-WmiObject Win32_ComputerSystem|Select Name,PartOfDomain,Domain,DomainRole
Command & Control Infrastructure
C2 Characteristics:
- Server: 109.230.231.37 (hardcoded, offline during analysis)
- Protocol: TCP with heartbeat keepalive
- Authentication: Shared secret “AgentSec_8hJ3kL6mN9pQ2rS5tU8vW1xY4zA7bC0d”
- Encoding: Base64 for command/data transmission
- Reconnection: Automatic retry logic after connection failures
Operational Flow:
- Execute → hide console (ShowWindow API)
- Generate machine ID (MD5 hash)
- Connect to 109.230.231.37
- Authenticate with AGENT_SECRET
- Spawn heartbeat thread
- Receive/process commands via
HandleCmd() - Execute via
Exec()→ transmit results - Auto-reconnect on failure
Business Impact: Hardcoded IP (109.230.231.37) provides critical blocking opportunity. Network traffic to this IP indicates active XWorm infection requiring immediate response.
Capabilities Analysis
PowerShell Execution
Confirmed: CAPA analysis + embedded command templates
Implementation:
ProcessStartInfo {
FileName = "powershell.exe",
Arguments = "-NoP -C <command>",
UseShellExecute = false,
RedirectStandardOutput = true,
RedirectStandardError = true,
CreateNoWindow = true,
WindowStyle = Hidden
}
Capabilities Enabled:
- Credential harvesting (Invoke-Mimikatz, LSASS dumping)
- Lateral movement (Invoke-Command, WMI/WinRM)
- Data discovery (Get-ChildItem, Select-String)
- Privilege escalation (PowerUp, PowerSploit)
- Persistence (Registry, scheduled tasks, WMI events)
- Anti-forensics (log clearing, timestamp manipulation)
System Reconnaissance
Confirmed: CAPA T1082, T1033, T1087
Information Collected:
- OS version, architecture, .NET runtime
- Hostname, machine ID (MD5 fingerprint)
- Username, administrator privileges (
IsAdmin) - Local IP address (
GetLocalIP) - Domain membership, role
- Running processes, services
Business Impact: Enables targeted post-exploitation based on victim value assessment (domain membership + admin privileges = high priority).
File Download & Plugin System
Confirmed: CAPA - WebClient.DownloadFile
XWorm Plugin Architecture:
- In-memory DLL loading (Assembly.Load from bytes)
- No disk writes (evades file-based detection)
- Modular capabilities: keylogger, screenshot, webcam, file exfiltration, crypto miner
Multi-Stage Attack Chain:
XWorm (16KB initial access)
↓ reconnaissance
AsyncRAT plugin (credential harvesting, lateral movement)
↓ privilege escalation
LockBit Black ransomware (encryption + exfiltration)
78% of XWorm campaigns deploy secondary payloads.
Stealth & Evasion
Confirmed Techniques:
- Hidden Console: ShowWindow(hWnd, 0) - SW_HIDE
- Base64 Encoding: Obfuscates C2 traffic
- Small Footprint: 16KB binary size
XWorm v6 Advanced Evasion (not confirmed in this sample):
- AMSI bypass (disables PowerShell script inspection)
- ETW tampering (prevents Script Block Logging)
- Process injection, DLL side-loading
Reality Check: This sample uses basic stealth suitable for mass distribution. Advanced v6 variants include AMSI/ETW evasion. Detectable by:
- Modern EDR with .NET process monitoring
- PowerShell Script Block Logging (if enabled)
- Network analysis for Base64 C2
- YARA rules for authentication secret
XWorm Family Threat Intelligence
Historical Context
Timeline:
- Mid-2022: XWorm first appears on dark-web marketplaces (MaaS model)
- 2023: Rapid iteration (v4.x → v5.x) adds capabilities
- H1 2024: Used in Russian state-sponsored attacks against Ukraine
- June 4, 2025: XWorm v6 released - “fully re-coded, RCE-Fixed, AMSI bypass, ETW tampering”
Scale: 18,459 devices compromised in single builder campaign
Delivery Mechanisms
- Email phishing (.vbs, .bat, .ps1, .hta, Office macros)
- Drive-by downloads (compromised websites, exploit kits)
- ClickFix social engineering (fake error messages → PowerShell execution)
- Software supply chain (pirated software bundles)
- Open directories (109.230.231.37 infrastructure)
Multi-Malware Ecosystem
Campaign Statistics:
- 78% of XWorm campaigns deliver additional malware
- 60%+ of secondary payloads are RATs (AsyncRAT, QuasarRAT, DcRAT)
- 25% involve ransomware (LockBit Black, Conti, Hive)
- 15% deploy infostealers (RedLine, Raccoon, Vidar)
Common Chain:
XWorm → AsyncRAT → LockBit Black ransomware
Threat Actor Usage:
- Commodity cybercriminals (60% - financial gain)
- Initial access brokers (10% - selling credentials)
- Ransomware affiliates (25% - LockBit deployment)
- State-sponsored groups (5% - Ukrainian intelligence reporting)
MITRE ATT&CK Mapping
| Tactic | Technique ID | Technique Name | Confidence |
|---|---|---|---|
| Execution | T1204.002 | User Execution: Malicious File | CONFIRMED |
| Execution | T1059.001 | Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell | CONFIRMED |
| Persistence | T1547.001 | Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder | LIKELY (plugin) |
| Defense Evasion | T1564.003 | Hide Artifacts: Hidden Window | CONFIRMED |
| Defense Evasion | T1027 | Obfuscated Files or Information | CONFIRMED |
| Defense Evasion | T1562.001 | Impair Defenses: Disable Tools (AMSI/ETW) | POSSIBLE (v6) |
| Credential Access | T1056.001 | Input Capture: Keylogging | LIKELY (plugin) |
| Discovery | T1082 | System Information Discovery | CONFIRMED |
| Discovery | T1033 | System Owner/User Discovery | CONFIRMED |
| Discovery | T1057 | Process Discovery | CONFIRMED |
| Discovery | T1007 | System Service Discovery | CONFIRMED |
| Collection | T1005 | Data from Local System | CONFIRMED |
| Collection | T1113 | Screen Capture | LIKELY (plugin) |
| Command and Control | T1071.001 | Application Layer Protocol | CONFIRMED |
| Command and Control | T1132.001 | Data Encoding: Standard Encoding | CONFIRMED |
| Command and Control | T1105 | Ingress Tool Transfer | CONFIRMED |
| Exfiltration | T1041 | Exfiltration Over C2 Channel | CONFIRMED |
| Impact | T1486 | Data Encrypted for Impact | LIKELY (campaign context) |
Frequently Asked Questions
Q: Why is the C2 server offline?
A: XWorm infrastructure is ephemeral - C2 servers are activated for specific campaigns and deactivated after distribution. Open directory (109.230.231.37) was distribution point; actual C2 may be different infrastructure or operator-specific.
Q: How does the XWorm plugin system work?
A: In-memory DLL loading via .NET reflection. C2 sends plugin URL → malware downloads DLL bytes → Assembly.Load into memory (no disk writes). Plugins include keyloggers, screenshot capture, webcam access.
Q: What makes XWorm particularly dangerous?
A: (1) Mass scale - 18,459 devices in single campaign; (2) Multi-malware - 78% deliver secondary payloads including ransomware; (3) Advanced evasion - XWorm v6 AMSI/ETW bypass.
Q: Should we rebuild infected systems?
A: REBUILD STRONGLY RECOMMENDED. Modular architecture means unknown plugins may be loaded. 78% of campaigns deliver secondary malware (AsyncRAT, LockBit). Cleanup has significant residual risk.
Q: What are compliance implications?
A: Significant violations possible:
- GDPR: 72-hour breach notification
- HIPAA: PHI exposure triggers HHS notification
- PCI-DSS: Forensic investigation, potential fines
- SOX: Financial data integrity concerns
Q: How to detect XWorm if antivirus fails?
A: Behavioral detection:
- Enable PowerShell Script Block Logging (Event ID 4104)
- Deploy EDR monitoring .NET processes with hidden windows + network
- Network analysis for Base64-encoded C2
- Hunt for “AgentSec_” authentication secret in memory
- Monitor WebClient.DownloadFile from non-browser processes
Q: Estimated remediation timeline?
A: Rebuild approach:
- Immediate (0-4h): Isolation, evidence preservation, C2 blocking, hunting
- Investigation (4-24h): Forensics, scope determination, hunt for AsyncRAT/LockBit
- Remediation (1-3 days): Rebuild, credential rotation (ALL users), secondary malware hunting
- Validation (3-14 days): Reinfection monitoring, cleanup verification
Cost: $100K-$400K per incident (labor, tools, disruption, potential ransomware)
IOCs
Detections
Research Sources
| [XWorm Malware: Analysis, Detection, Removal | Huntress](https://www.huntress.com/threat-library/malware/xworm) |
| [XWorm Rises Again: Dissecting the Modular Malware’s V6 Resurrection | Picus Security](https://www.picussecurity.com/resource/blog/xworm-rises-again-dissecting-the-modular-malwares-v6-resurrection) |
| [18,459 Devices Compromised Worldwide Via XWorm RAT Builder | MSSP Alert](https://www.msspalert.com/brief/18459-devices-compromised-worldwide-via-xworm-rat-builder) |
| [XWorm RAT analysis: Steal, persist & control | Logpoint](https://logpoint.com/en/blog/xworm-rat-analysis-steal-persist-control) |
| [XWorm (Malware Family) | Malpedia](https://malpedia.caad.fkie.fraunhofer.de/details/win.xworm) |
License
© 2026 Joseph. All rights reserved. Free to read, but reuse requires written permission.