Detection Rules - BdApiUtil64.sys (Arsenal-237 BYOVD Component)

Overview

This detection guide focuses on identifying BdApiUtil64.sys, a weaponized legitimate Baidu Antivirus kernel driver used in BYOVD (Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver) attacks. This driver provides kernel-level Ring-0 access enabling security product termination, malicious service creation, and credential theft.

Malware Family: Arsenal-237 BYOVD Component Severity: CRITICAL Attack Chain Function: Kernel-level defense evasion enabler - neutralizes EDR/AV to allow ransomware/malware execution Primary IOCTLs: 0x800024b4 (process termination), 0x800024b8 (SSDT bypass), 0x80002324 (service manipulation), 0x80002648/0x8000264c (file access) Last Updated: 2026-01-26

Detection Strategy

Priority 1: Driver Load Detection (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

Focus on driver load events with Baidu signature, expired certificates, and suspicious service creation as highest-priority indicators.

Priority 2: Behavioral Detection

Monitor DeviceIoControl calls to \\.\BdApiUtil and security product process terminations correlated with driver load.

Priority 3: SSDT Bypass Detection

Detect advanced evasion via KeServiceDescriptorTable resolution and indirect system calls.

Table of Contents

  1. YARA Detection Rules
  2. Sigma Detection Rules
  3. EDR Hunting Queries
  4. SIEM Detection Rules
  5. Implementation Guidance

YARA Detection Rules

Rule 1: BdApiUtil64.sys File Hash Detection

rule Arsenal237_BdApiUtil64_Hash {
    meta:
        description = "Detects Arsenal-237 BdApiUtil64.sys by file hash"
        author = "Threat Intelligence Team"
        date = "2026-01-26"
        hash = "47ec51b5f0ede1e70bd66f3f0152f9eb536d534565dbb7fcc3a05f542dbe4428"
        severity = "CRITICAL"
        family = "Arsenal-237"
        technique = "T1068 - BYOVD Exploitation"

    condition:
        hash.sha256(0, filesize) == "47ec51b5f0ede1e70bd66f3f0152f9eb536d534565dbb7fcc3a05f542dbe4428" or
        hash.md5(0, filesize) == "ced47b89212f3260ebeb41682a4b95ec" or
        hash.sha1(0, filesize) == "148c0cde4f2ef807aea77d7368f00f4c519f47ef"
}

Rule 2: Baidu Driver Signature Pattern

rule Arsenal237_BdApiUtil_Signature {
    meta:
        description = "Detects BdApiUtil64.sys by Baidu signature and PDB path"
        author = "Threat Intelligence Team"
        date = "2026-01-26"
        severity = "HIGH"
        technique = "T1068 - BYOVD with Legitimate Signature"

    strings:
        $pdb = "D:\\jenkins\\workspace\\bav_5.0_workspace\\BavOutput\\Pdb\\Release\\BdApiUtil64.pdb" ascii wide
        $signer = "Baidu Online Network Technology" ascii wide
        $product = "Baidu Antivirus" ascii wide
        $device = "\\Device\\BdApiUtil" ascii wide
        $service = "Bprotect" ascii wide
        $callback = "bdProtectExpCallBack" ascii wide

    condition:
        uint16(0) == 0x5A4D and
        uint32(uint32(0x3C)) == 0x00004550 and
        (2 of ($*))
}

Rule 3: IOCTL Code Pattern Detection

rule Arsenal237_BdApiUtil_IOCTL_Abuse {
    meta:
        description = "Detects malware using BdApiUtil64.sys IOCTL codes"
        author = "Threat Intelligence Team"
        date = "2026-01-26"
        severity = "HIGH"
        technique = "T1562.001 - Process Termination via Driver IOCTLs"

    strings:
        // Primary IOCTL codes
        $ioctl1 = { B4 24 00 80 }    // 0x800024b4 - Direct termination
        $ioctl2 = { B8 24 00 80 }    // 0x800024b8 - SSDT bypass
        $ioctl3 = { 24 23 00 80 }    // 0x80002324 - Service manipulation
        $ioctl4 = { 48 26 00 80 }    // 0x80002648 - File access 1
        $ioctl5 = { 4C 26 00 80 }    // 0x8000264c - File access 2

        // DeviceIoControl API
        $api = "DeviceIoControl" ascii wide

        // Device name
        $device = "\\\\.\\BdApiUtil" ascii wide

    condition:
        uint16(0) == 0x5A4D and
        $api and $device and
        2 of ($ioctl*)
}

Rule 4: SSDT Bypass Pattern

rule Arsenal237_BdApiUtil_SSDT_Bypass {
    meta:
        description = "Detects SSDT bypass implementation in malware"
        author = "Threat Intelligence Team"
        date = "2026-01-26"
        severity = "CRITICAL"
        technique = "T1027.010 - SSDT Indirect System Calls"

    strings:
        $ssdt_string = "KeServiceDescriptorTable" ascii wide
        $api1 = "MmGetSystemRoutineAddress" ascii wide
        $api2 = "RtlInitUnicodeString" ascii wide

        // Hook detection pattern (checking for 0xb8 opcode)
        $hook_check = { 80 3? B8 }    // cmp byte ptr [reg], 0xb8

        // SSDT lookup pattern
        $ssdt_lookup = { 8B ?? ?? C1 E? 02 }    // mov reg, [reg+offset]; shl reg, 2

    condition:
        uint16(0) == 0x5A4D and
        $ssdt_string and
        all of ($api*) and
        1 of ($hook_check, $ssdt_lookup)
}

Rule 5: Kernel Process Termination Pattern

rule Arsenal237_BdApiUtil_Kernel_Termination {
    meta:
        description = "Detects kernel-mode process termination capabilities"
        author = "Threat Intelligence Team"
        date = "2026-01-26"
        severity = "HIGH"
        technique = "T1562.001 - Kernel-Level Security Product Termination"

    strings:
        // Kernel APIs for process termination
        $api1 = "PsLookupProcessByProcessId" ascii
        $api2 = "ZwTerminateProcess" ascii
        $api3 = "ObOpenObjectByPointer" ascii
        $api4 = "ObDereferenceObject" ascii

        // Target security products
        $target1 = "MsMpEng.exe" ascii wide nocase
        $target2 = "CSFalconService.exe" ascii wide nocase
        $target3 = "ekrn.exe" ascii wide nocase
        $target4 = "avp.exe" ascii wide nocase

    condition:
        uint16(0) == 0x5A4D and
        3 of ($api*) and
        2 of ($target*)
}

Sigma Detection Rules

Rule 1: BdApiUtil64.sys Driver Load Detection

title: Suspicious Baidu Driver Load (BdApiUtil64.sys BYOVD)
id: a1b2c3d4-e5f6-7890-1234-567890abcdef
status: stable
description: Detects loading of vulnerable Baidu driver (BdApiUtil64.sys) used in BYOVD attacks
references:
    - Arsenal-237 malware toolkit analysis
    - BlackByte, Cuba, ALPHV ransomware campaigns
author: Threat Intelligence Team
date: 2026-01-26
modified: 2026-01-26
tags:
    - attack.defense_evasion
    - attack.t1068
    - attack.t1562.001
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: driver_load
detection:
    selection_hash:
        Hashes|contains:
            - '47ec51b5f0ede1e70bd66f3f0152f9eb536d534565dbb7fcc3a05f542dbe4428'
            - 'ced47b89212f3260ebeb41682a4b95ec'
            - '148c0cde4f2ef807aea77d7368f00f4c519f47ef'
    selection_signature:
        ImageLoaded|contains: 'BdApiUtil'
        Signed: 'true'
        Signature|contains: 'Baidu'
    selection_expired:
        ImageLoaded|endswith: '.sys'
        Signed: 'true'
        SignatureStatus: 'Valid'
        Signature|contains: 'Baidu'
    condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate Baidu Antivirus installation (very rare in enterprise environments)
level: critical

Rule 2: Bprotect Service Creation

title: Suspicious Bprotect Service Creation (BdApiUtil64.sys)
id: b2c3d4e5-f6g7-8901-2345-678901bcdefg
status: stable
description: Detects creation of Bprotect service associated with BdApiUtil64.sys driver
references:
    - Arsenal-237 BYOVD technique
author: Threat Intelligence Team
date: 2026-01-26
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.t1547.006
    - attack.defense_evasion
    - attack.t1562.001
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: system
detection:
    selection:
        EventID: 7045
        ServiceName: 'Bprotect'
        ImagePath|contains: 'BdApiUtil'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate Baidu Antivirus installation
level: critical

Rule 3: Security Product Termination Correlation

title: Security Product Termination After Driver Load (BYOVD Pattern)
id: c3d4e5f6-g7h8-9012-3456-789012cdefgh
status: stable
description: Detects security product process termination shortly after suspicious driver load
references:
    - BYOVD attack pattern
    - Arsenal-237 toolkit
author: Threat Intelligence Team
date: 2026-01-26
tags:
    - attack.defense_evasion
    - attack.t1562.001
    - attack.impact
    - attack.t1489
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: sysmon
detection:
    selection_driver:
        EventID: 6
        ImageLoaded|contains:
            - 'BdApiUtil'
            - 'Baidu'
    selection_termination:
        EventID: 5
        Image|endswith:
            - 'MsMpEng.exe'
            - 'CSFalconService.exe'
            - 'ekrn.exe'
            - 'avp.exe'
            - 'SophosHealth.exe'
            - 'cb.exe'
            - 'MBAMService.exe'
    timeframe: 60s
    condition: selection_driver and selection_termination | near selection_driver
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate service restarts during updates (check timing correlation)
level: critical

Rule 4: DeviceIoControl to BdApiUtil Device

title: DeviceIoControl Calls to BdApiUtil Driver
id: d4e5f6g7-h8i9-0123-4567-890123defghi
status: experimental
description: Detects DeviceIoControl API calls to \\.\BdApiUtil device object
references:
    - Arsenal-237 BYOVD IOCTL abuse
author: Threat Intelligence Team
date: 2026-01-26
tags:
    - attack.defense_evasion
    - attack.t1562.001
    - attack.collection
    - attack.t1005
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: process_access
detection:
    selection_api:
        CallTrace|contains: 'DeviceIoControl'
    selection_device:
        TargetObject|contains: '\\.\BdApiUtil'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate Baidu Antivirus operations (rare)
level: high

Rule 5: SSDT Resolution Attempt

title: KeServiceDescriptorTable Resolution (SSDT Bypass Attempt)
id: e5f6g7h8-i9j0-1234-5678-901234efghij
status: experimental
description: Detects attempts to resolve KeServiceDescriptorTable for SSDT bypass
references:
    - Advanced EDR evasion via SSDT bypass
    - Arsenal-237 BdApiUtil64.sys capability
author: Threat Intelligence Team
date: 2026-01-26
tags:
    - attack.defense_evasion
    - attack.t1027.010
    - attack.t1562.001
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: kernel_api
detection:
    selection:
        CallTrace|contains:
            - 'MmGetSystemRoutineAddress'
            - 'KeServiceDescriptorTable'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate kernel drivers (verify driver signature and vendor)
level: high

EDR Hunting Queries

CrowdStrike Falcon Query

// Hunt for BdApiUtil64.sys driver load and related activity
event_simpleName IN ("DriverLoad", "ProcessRollup2", "ServiceInstall")
| where (event_simpleName="DriverLoad" AND (ImageLoaded="*BdApiUtil*" OR SHA256HashData="47ec51b5f0ede1e70bd66f3f0152f9eb536d534565dbb7fcc3a05f542dbe4428"))
    OR (event_simpleName="ServiceInstall" AND ServiceName="Bprotect")
    OR (event_simpleName="ProcessRollup2" AND (FileName="MsMpEng.exe" OR FileName="CSFalconService.exe") AND ProcessEndReason="Terminated")
| summarize EventCount=count(), FirstSeen=min(ContextTimeStamp), LastSeen=max(ContextTimeStamp) by ComputerName, event_simpleName, FileName, ImageLoaded, ServiceName
| sort by LastSeen desc

Microsoft Sentinel (KQL)

// BdApiUtil64.sys BYOVD detection - driver load and security product termination correlation
let DriverLoad =
    DeviceEvents
    | where ActionType == "DriverLoad"
    | where FileName =~ "BdApiUtil64.sys"
        or SHA256 == "47ec51b5f0ede1e70bd66f3f0152f9eb536d534565dbb7fcc3a05f542dbe4428"
        or InitiatingProcessFileName contains "BdApiUtil"
    | extend DriverLoadTime = Timestamp
    | project DeviceName, DriverLoadTime, FileName, SHA256, InitiatingProcessFileName;
let SecurityProductTermination =
    DeviceProcessEvents
    | where ActionType == "ProcessTerminated"
    | where FileName in~ ("MsMpEng.exe", "MpDefenderCoreService.exe", "CSFalconService.exe", "ekrn.exe", "avp.exe", "SophosHealth.exe", "cb.exe", "MBAMService.exe")
    | extend TerminationTime = Timestamp
    | project DeviceName, TerminationTime, FileName, ProcessCommandLine;
DriverLoad
| join kind=inner (SecurityProductTermination) on DeviceName
| where TerminationTime between (DriverLoadTime .. (DriverLoadTime + 60s))
| project DeviceName, DriverLoadTime, DriverFileName=FileName, TerminationTime, TerminatedProcess=FileName1, SHA256
| sort by DriverLoadTime desc

Elastic Security (EQL)

// BdApiUtil64.sys service creation and driver load sequence
sequence by host.name with maxspan=5m
  [registry where registry.path : "*\\Services\\Bprotect*" and event.action == "creation"]
  [driver where file.name : "BdApiUtil64.sys"]
  [process where
    event.action == "termination" and
    process.name in ("MsMpEng.exe", "CSFalconService.exe", "ekrn.exe", "avp.exe")]

Splunk SPL

// BdApiUtil64.sys BYOVD detection - comprehensive hunt
index=windows (sourcetype=WinEventLog:Sysmon OR sourcetype=WinEventLog:Security)
(
    (EventCode=6 ImageLoaded="*BdApiUtil*") OR
    (EventCode=6 Hashes="*47ec51b5f0ede1e70bd66f3f0152f9eb536d534565dbb7fcc3a05f542dbe4428*") OR
    (EventCode=7045 ServiceName="Bprotect") OR
    (EventCode=5 Image IN ("*MsMpEng.exe", "*CSFalconService.exe", "*ekrn.exe", "*avp.exe"))
)
| eval event_type=case(
    EventCode=6, "DriverLoad",
    EventCode=7045, "ServiceCreation",
    EventCode=5, "ProcessTermination"
)
| stats count earliest(_time) as FirstSeen latest(_time) as LastSeen by ComputerName, event_type, Image, ImageLoaded, ServiceName
| convert ctime(FirstSeen) ctime(LastSeen)
| sort -LastSeen

SIEM Detection Rules

Rule 1: Driver Load Hash-Based Detection

Rule Name: Arsenal-237 BdApiUtil64.sys BYOVD Driver Load (Hash-Based)
Severity: CRITICAL
MITRE: T1068, T1562.001

Logic:
  Event Source: Sysmon (Event ID 6) OR Windows Security (Event ID 4697)
  Condition:
    (Hashes CONTAINS "47ec51b5f0ede1e70bd66f3f0152f9eb536d534565dbb7fcc3a05f542dbe4428") OR
    (Hashes CONTAINS "ced47b89212f3260ebeb41682a4b95ec") OR
    (Hashes CONTAINS "148c0cde4f2ef807aea77d7368f00f4c519f47ef")

Action: Generate CRITICAL alert, isolate system, initiate IR

False Positives: Legitimate Baidu Antivirus (extremely rare in enterprise)

Rule 2: Behavioral Correlation - Driver Load + Process Termination

Rule Name: Security Product Termination After Suspicious Driver Load
Severity: CRITICAL
MITRE: T1562.001, T1489

Logic:
  Event Sequence:
    Step 1: Driver load (Sysmon Event ID 6)
      - ImageLoaded CONTAINS "BdApiUtil" OR
      - Signed = TRUE AND Signature CONTAINS "Baidu"

    Step 2: Process termination (Sysmon Event ID 5) within 60 seconds
      - Image IN:
          - MsMpEng.exe
          - CSFalconService.exe
          - ekrn.exe
          - avp.exe
          - SophosHealth.exe
          - cb.exe
          - MBAMService.exe

    Correlation: Same ComputerName, Step 2 within 60 seconds of Step 1

Action: Generate CRITICAL alert, isolate system immediately, alert CISO

False Positives: Security product updates (verify timing patterns)

Rule 3: Service Creation - Bprotect Service

Rule Name: Bprotect Service Creation (BdApiUtil64.sys Persistence)
Severity: HIGH
MITRE: T1547.006, T1543.003

Logic:
  Event Source: Windows Security (Event ID 4697) OR Sysmon (Event ID 13)
  Condition:
    ServiceName = "Bprotect" AND
    ImagePath CONTAINS "BdApiUtil"

Additional Context:
  - Check if system has legitimate Baidu Antivirus installed
  - Correlate with driver load events

Action: Generate HIGH alert, initiate threat hunt for Arsenal-237 toolkit

False Positives: Legitimate Baidu Antivirus installation

Rule 4: Registry Callback Registration

Rule Name: Suspicious Registry Callback Registration (Defense Evasion)
Severity: HIGH
MITRE: T1112, T1562.001

Logic:
  Event Source: Sysmon (Event ID 12/13/14) OR Windows Security (Event ID 4657)
  Condition:
    TargetObject CONTAINS "\\Callback\\bdProtectExpCallBack" OR
    (RegistryPath CONTAINS "\\Services\\Bprotect" AND
     EventType = "CreateKey")

Action: Generate HIGH alert, investigate for security control tampering

False Positives: Legitimate Baidu Antivirus operations

Rule 5: File Access to Protected Credential Stores

Rule Name: Kernel Driver Accessing Protected Credential Stores
Severity: CRITICAL
MITRE: T1005, T1555

Logic:
  Event Source: Sysmon (Event ID 11) OR Windows Security (Event ID 4663)
  Condition:
    ProcessName CONTAINS "BdApiUtil" OR
    (ProcessName CONTAINS "System" AND
     TargetFilename IN:
       - "*\\config\\SAM"
       - "*\\config\\SYSTEM"
       - "*\\Credentials\\*"
       - "*\\Login Data"
       - "*\\logins.json")

Action: Generate CRITICAL alert, assume credential compromise, force password resets

False Positives: Legitimate system backup operations (verify context)

Implementation Guidance

Phase 1: Immediate Deployment (Day 1)

  1. Hash-Based Detection:
    • Deploy SHA256 hash 47ec51b5f0ede1e70bd66f3f0152f9eb536d534565dbb7fcc3a05f542dbe4428 to all EDR/AV platforms
    • Configure automatic quarantine and alert on detection
    • Estimated FP rate: < 0.01% (legitimate Baidu AV extremely rare in enterprise)
  2. Driver Load Monitoring:
    • Enable Sysmon Event ID 6 (Driver Load) logging
    • Configure SIEM alert for BdApiUtil64.sys driver loads
    • Alert on any driver with Baidu signature loading outside of Baidu AV installation
  3. Service Creation Monitoring:
    • Monitor Event ID 4697 (Service Installation) for “Bprotect” service
    • Alert on any kernel driver service created outside of standard installers

Phase 2: Behavioral Detection (Week 1)

  1. Process Termination Correlation:
    • Implement 60-second correlation window between driver load and security product termination
    • Baseline normal security product restart patterns
    • Alert on abnormal termination sequences
  2. DeviceIoControl Monitoring:
    • Enable process access monitoring (Sysmon Event ID 10)
    • Monitor for DeviceIoControl API calls to \\.\BdApiUtil
    • Alert on IOCTL codes: 0x800024b4, 0x800024b8, 0x80002324, 0x80002648, 0x8000264c
  3. Registry Monitoring:
    • Monitor registry keys: HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\Bprotect
    • Alert on registry callback registration by non-Microsoft drivers

Phase 3: Advanced Detection (Week 2-4)

  1. SSDT Bypass Detection:
    • Monitor for MmGetSystemRoutineAddress calls resolving KeServiceDescriptorTable
    • Alert on indirect system call patterns from drivers
    • Requires kernel-level EDR capabilities
  2. File Access Monitoring:
    • Monitor file access to: SAM, SYSTEM, Credentials directories, browser credential stores
    • Alert on kernel driver accessing protected locations
    • Correlate with driver load events
  3. Threat Hunting:
    • Weekly hunt for Arsenal-237 toolkit components (lpe.exe, killer.dll, rootkit.dll, enc_*.exe)
    • Search for driver loads with expired certificates (2015 expiration)
    • Hunt for services with suspicious names (security/Windows impersonation)

Phase 4: Prevention Controls (Ongoing)

  1. Microsoft Vulnerable Driver Blocklist:
    • Deploy MVDB on Windows 11 systems with HVCI enabled
    • Blocks BdApiUtil64.sys from loading
    • Recommended for all new deployments
  2. Driver Signature Enforcement:
    • Enable driver signature enforcement policies
    • Configure WDAC (Windows Defender Application Control) to block unsigned/expired drivers
    • Implement attestation signing requirements
  3. Least Privilege Enforcement:
    • Restrict SeLoadDriverPrivilege to authorized administrators only
    • Implement service creation restrictions
    • Enable tamper protection on security products

Detection Confidence Levels

Detection Method Confidence False Positive Rate Coverage
Hash-based detection 100% < 0.01% Known samples only
Driver signature (Baidu + expired) 95% < 1% Signature variants
Service creation (Bprotect) 90% < 1% Specific naming
Behavioral correlation 85% 5-10% Evasion attempts
IOCTL monitoring 80% 10-15% Requires tuning
SSDT bypass detection 70% 15-20% Advanced evasion

Expected Detection Timeline

  • Driver Load Detection: < 1 second (real-time)
  • Service Creation Detection: < 5 seconds (near real-time)
  • Behavioral Correlation: 60 seconds (correlation window)
  • SSDT Bypass Detection: 1-5 minutes (analysis overhead)
  • Threat Hunt Discovery: Daily/Weekly (scheduled hunts)
  1. CRITICAL (P1): Hash match + Driver load + Security product termination
  2. HIGH (P2): Driver load + Service creation OR Behavioral correlation
  3. MEDIUM (P3): IOCTL monitoring alerts OR Registry modifications
  4. LOW (P4): SSDT resolution attempts (requires context validation)

Integration Notes

  • Sysmon: Ensure Event IDs 6 (Driver Load), 10 (Process Access), 13 (Registry), 5 (Process Termination) are enabled
  • EDR: Verify kernel-level monitoring capabilities for SSDT detection
  • SIEM: Configure 60-second correlation window for behavioral detection
  • SOAR: Implement automatic isolation for CRITICAL alerts
  • Threat Intel: Cross-reference with Arsenal-237 toolkit IOCs (109.230.231.37, lpe.exe, killer.dll, rootkit.dll)

Summary

BdApiUtil64.sys represents a critical kernel-level threat requiring multi-layered detection:

  • Hash-based detection (100% confidence) for known samples
  • Behavioral correlation (85% confidence) for driver load + security product termination
  • SSDT bypass detection (70% confidence) for advanced evasion variants
  • Microsoft MVDB deployment (prevention) for Windows 11 environments

Recommended Response: Immediate system isolation, full system rebuild, credential rotation, 30-day enhanced monitoring.

Last Updated: 2026-01-26 Maintainer: Threat Intelligence Team License: (c) 2026 Joseph. All rights reserved. Free to read, but reuse requires written permission.